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TAXATION-FEDERAL TAX LIENS-SECTION 6321 OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE AS BASIS FOR INJUNCTION BINDING ASSETS OF FOREIGN
BRANCH OF AMERICAN BANK-The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
issued jeopardy assessments against the taxpayer, Omar, S.A., a Uruguayan
corporation. To avoid payment, Omar began to liquidate its American-held
assets by transferring receipts out of the country. Pursuant to its statutory
right, under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,1 to impose
a lien upon all property of a delinquent taxpayer, the United States brought
suit against Omar and various New York banks in the domestic and
foreign branches of which Omar's funds were deposited. The district court
granted a preliminary injunction2 restraining certain of the banks from
transferring any property whether located in the United States or held
by the banks for Omar in foreign branches. On appeal, held, injunction
modified so as not to include property held by the foreign branches of
the appealing American bank. Since a foreign branch bank is a separate
entity from the parent bank, jurisdiction over the parent does not constitute
jurisdiction over funds deposited in the branch. United States v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963).
The effect of section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is
to create a statutory attachment or garnishment without requiring court
processes necessary in ordinary garnishment proceedings.3 Where for
some reason personal jurisdiction over the delinquent taxpayer is unobtainable, the Government is able to proceed in actions quasi in rem to enforce
its lien on specific property4 belonging to the taxpayer within the jurisdic1 !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6321, provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest,
additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that
may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
See also INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6322, 6331, 6332.
2 The injunction issued pursuant to !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § '7402(a), which grants
jurisdiction to district courts "to make and issue in civil actions, writs and orders of
injunction, and of ne exeat republica, orders appointing receivers, and such other orders
and processes, and to render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or
appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws." See also INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § '7403.
a See, e.g., United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955), where the court held
that "the effect of the federal taxing statutes •.. is to create a statutory attachment and
garnishment.in which the service of notice provided by statute takes the place of the court
process in the ordinary garnishment proceeding." Id. at 121.
4 "Property" is here construed to include rights to property.
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tion of the court.5 In the principal case the court did not have in personam
jurisdiction of Omar. Therefore, the crucial question was whether in
personam jurisdiction of Omar's debtor, First National, conferred quasi in
rem jurisdiction of Omar's funds. The Government argued that section 6321
has a global effect and therefore in personam jurisdiction of the bank's home
office in New York was enough to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction of
Omar's extraterritorial funds, since the home office could control the
foreign branch. The majority of the court assumed that if it had no jurisdiction of Omar's funds outside the United States any injunction issued
pursuant to the suit which purported to bind foreign-held assets was
improper. 6 As a result, the majority examined the law of garnishment proceedings to determine whether the bank's debt to Omar was within the
jurisdiction of the district court.7 The nature of garnishment is such that
the garnisher obtains no greater right against the garnishee than the
garnishee's creditor has. 8 Thus, only if Omar could sue First National in
New York to recover its deposits would the court have jurisdiction over
the funds in the foreign branch. Omar's right to sue in New York depended
on its right against First National arising out of a deposit made in the
latter's branch. The nature of Omar's right to sue was to be determined
by New York state law, for the federal tax lien statute creates no property
rights, but merely attaches consequences to rights created under state
law. 9 In holding against the Government the court relied on a line of New
York cases which indicate that accounts in a foreign branch bank are not
subject to attachment or execution by the process of a New York court
served in New York on a main office, branch, or agency of the bank. 10 This
II United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968
(1957).
a In the principal case Judge Hays dissented on the ground that the only issue involved
was the propriety of the district court's order. Since the court had in personam jurisdiction
over appellant it could order appellant to freeze Omar's funds. Judge Hays felt that the
entire issue dealing with whether the Government's lien attached was to be left for
the pending action against Omar; since the appeal was from the district court's order,
the propriety of the order, not the attachment of the lien, was the only issue. Principal
case at 325 (dissenting opinion).
7 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), where the Court said that a state
has no right "to enter a judgment purporting to extinguish the interest of such a person
[over whom it has no personal jurisdiction] in property over which the court has no
jurisdiction." Id. at 250. For the original statement of this doctrine, see Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
8 E.g., if the garnishee and garnishee's creditor have a contract based upon a contingency, the gamisher cannot successfully sue the garnishee until the contingency
has occurred because the garnishee's creditor cannot collect until then. Kama-Smith Co. v.
Maloney, 112 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1940).
9 See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960) (government tax lien could not
attach to insurance policy unless taxpayer had property rights in the policy as defined
by state law); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958) (taxpayer's property rights under
a contract to be determined by state law); Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.
1952) (government lien upon taxpayer's bank account limited by taxpayer's state-defined
rights in the account).
10 See Comment, 56 MICH. L. REv. 90 (1957).
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line of cases follows the so-called "separate entity" theory, which holds that
branches of a bank are to be treated as separate legal entities.
In general, the main office and branches are regarded as one legal entity.
The branch bank is considered the agent of the parent bank, with the
parent ultimately liable for debts of the branch.11 Consideration of the
main office and branches as one entity is based on obvious policy factors.
The board of directors, located at the situs of the main office, has control
over the various branches.12 The bank, including its foreign and domestic
branches, is taxable as a single corporate entity.18 Moreover, federal law
maintains the character of the banking operations as a single entity by
requiring banks to operate abroad by means of branches rather than foreign
subsidiary corporations.14 Yet, despite these reasons for regarding the entire
banking operation as a single entity, in certain situations generally characterized as "arm's-length relationships" foreign branch banks are deemed
separate entities from the domestic parent.15 Branches or agencies have been
held to be independent entities in four major respects: deposits are payable
to the depositor only at the branch where deposited; 16 checks made out
to third parties need be honored only when drawn on the branch which is
the situs of the deposit; 17 a subpoena duces tecum on a foreign branch
bank's records is void; 18 and a foreign branch is separate with regard to the
collection of forwarded paper.1 9
The important factor in any attempt to harmonize the cases is that a
foreign branch in each of the above situations has been held a separate entity
11 See Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y. Supp. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1927),
afj'd, 223 App. Div. 754, 227 N.Y. Supp. 907, afj'd, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928).
The Sokoloff case was decided prior to § 138 of the N.Y. BANKING LAw, which reads:
"Any bank ..• which ••. shall have opened and occupied a branch office or branch
offices in any foreign country shall be liable for contracts to be performed at such
branch office or offices • . • to no greater extent than a bank • . • organized and
existing under the laws of such foreign country would be liable under its laws."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-106, recognizes the separate entity principle in providing
that "a branch or separate office of a bank [maintaining its own deposit ledgers] is a
separate bank for the purpose of computing the time within which and determining the
place at or to which action may be taken or notices or orders shall be given under
this Article • . . ."
12 The Board of Directors of First National City Bank is located in New York.
13 Posades v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1935).
14 38 Stat. 273 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1958).
15 For a general discussion of the separate entity doctrine, see Note, 48 CORNELL L.Q.
333 (1963).
16 See Murtaugh v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 149 Misc. 693, 269 N.Y. Supp.
65 (N.Y. City Ct. 1933); Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 249 N.Y.
Supp. 319 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931).
17 See Chrzanowska v. Com Exch. Bank, 173 App. Div. 285, 159 N.Y.S. 385 (1916),
afj'd, 225 N.Y. 728, 122 N.E. 877 (1919).
18 The separate entity theory was used in this respect in In re Harris, 27 F. Supp.
480 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); that part of Harris which involved the separate entity theory, however,
was subsequently overruled in First Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue Serv., 271 F.2d
616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948, rehearing denied, 362 U.S. 906 (1960).
19 See Pan-American Bank &: Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925).
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for a specific purpose. The separate entity doctrine is thus an exception
to the usual single entity rule and is used when a court deems it necessary
to insulate one office of a bank from liability incurred by another. It does
not necessarily follow, therefore, that in every instance a branch is to be
treated as a separate entity. The principal case is the first case to hold that
branch banks are to be treated as separate entities so as to limit any global
effect of section 6321. The court has thus chosen to take a rule having its
genesis in policy considerations dealing with banking and to apply that
rule so as to limit the collection of tax revenue. In so limiting the effect of
the statute the court chose to reject the possibility of extending the doctrine
of several cases where extraterritorial injunctions have been upheld.
The issuance of injunctions which have effect beyond the court's
territorial jurisdiction is not a new concept, even when such effect takes
place in foreign countries. In antitrust cases courts have gone so far as
to issue injunctions prohibiting activity in a foreign country.20 Moreover,
extraterritorial injunctions involving tax liens were upheld specifically in
two cases cited by the Government in the principal case. In First Nat'l
City Bank v. Internal Revenue Serv.21 the court upheld a subpoena duces
tecum which required the bank to order its Panamanian branch to return
books located in Panama. In that case it was determined that the main
office definitely had the power to order such compliance by its branch.22
The court in the principal case, however, limited First Nat'l City Bank v.
Internal Revenue Serv. to its facts, finding that while extraterritorial actions
could be sustained to order the production of a branch's books, such extraterritorial actions could not be sustained to order the branch to freeze a
creditor's funds. In United States v. Ross23 the court affirmed an injunction
ordering Ross, the major stockholder and company president, to refrain
from transferring property of two Bahamian corporations. The court had
jurisdiction of Ross, but not of either corporation. The court held that
jurisdiction of the defendant controlling the property is sufficient to order
him to transfer property regardless of whether that property is within or
without the court's territorial jurisdiction.24 The crucial distinction between
Ross and the principal case is that in Ross the court had jurisdiction of the
delinquent taxpayer, while in the principal case the court had jurisdiction
20 See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See also Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Whitney, Sources of
Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655 (1954);
Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1452 (1956).
21 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
22 The issue in the principal case was not whether the New York office had the
controlling power to order its branches to freeze an account; instead, the issue was
whether defendant was legally obligated to do so.
23 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962).
24 See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); Marshall v. Turnbull,
32 Fed. 124 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1887); SEC v. Minas De Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.
1945). See also REsTATEMENT, CONFUcr OF LAws §§ 97, 94, comment a (1934).
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only of the delinquent taxpayer's debtor. Yet the court in the principal case,
had it so desired, could have extended the Ross doctrine to cover the
principal case. Both cases involved tax liens established under the Internal
Revenue Code and not patently based on jurisdiction of the delinquent
taxpayer. Rather than extend the Ross holding to sustain an extraterritorial
injunction directed at the delinquent taxpayer's debtor, however, the
court chose to apply the separate entity doctrine to limit the potential
impact of Ross. Since the separate entity doctrine is a judicial tool used to
reach a desired result, the policy considerations against giving section 6321
a global effect must have controlled the court's decision. In light of these
considerations, the court's decision would appear convincing. The court
pointed out the important factors which militate against giving section 6321
a global effect. The first is the problem of valuing foreign deposits in
satisfaction of a tax claim stated in dollars. The multiple and fluctuating
exchange rates of many countries compound this problem.25 Second,
foreign depositors, realizing that their funds could be frozen if put in
branch banks having parent offices situated within American jurisdiction,
would be discouraged from dealing with foreign branches of American
banks.26 This would tend to impair the competitive position of the American
branches. The most compelling consideration before the court, however,
was the potential conflict of laws problem.27 Foreign branch banks are
licensed under foreign law; the law of the situs governs. As a result, an
injunction requiring foreign branch banks to freeze funds might subject the
entire banking operation to double liability: once to the corporation (such
as Omar) suing in the foreign country, which would probably not respect
the American injunction; and again to the United States as a penalty for
violating the injunction. Moreover, the issuance of an injunction as asked
for by the Government would seem to mean that foreign courts would,
in turn, be able to issue injunctions against the American branch which
would affect accounts or activities of the head office in the United States.
As the court in the principal case said, "The untoward difficulties and
potential conflict between the laws of different nations that such a doctrine
would produce militate against giving it support here." 28
It would appear, therefore, that latent considerations form a sounder
basis for the decision in the principal case than a rubber stamp application
25 See Richard v. American Union Bank, 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E. 532 (1930). A useful
standard for resolving this problem is UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-212(6), which
provides a formula for adjustment to foreign currencies in regard to a bank's right
of charge-back or refund: "If a credit is given in dollars as the equivalent of the value
of an item payable in a foreign currency the dollar amount of any charge-back or
refund shall be calculated on the basis of the buying sight rate for the foreign currency
prevailing on the day when the person entitled to the charge-back or refund learns
that it will not receive payment in ordinary course."
26 See principal case at 24.
27 See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281 (1949).
28 Principal case at 24.
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of the separate entity doctrine. When the scope of section 6321 is adjudicated in future cases, the important question will be whether the
holding in the principal case will be limited to cases dealing with international banking or will be extended to cover other uses of the tax lien
power. Since international banking involves unique considerations, it would
seem advisable to limit the principal case to its facts, and consider each
new attempt by the Government to reach foreign-held assets on the basis
of the particular policies involved.
Gerald ]. Laba

